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Abstract We present Unit-B, a formal method inspired by
Event-B and UNITY. Unit-B aims at the stepwise design
of software systems satisfying safety and liveness proper-
ties. The method features the novel notion of coarse and fine
schedules, a generalisation of weak and strong fairness for
specifying events’ scheduling assumptions. Based on events
schedules, we propose proof rules to reason about progress
properties and a refinement order preserving both liveness
and safety properties. We illustrate our approach by an ex-
ample to show that systems development can be driven by
not only safety but also liveness requirements.
Keywords progress properties · refinement · fairness ·
scheduling · Unit-B · proof-based formal methods ·
verification of cyber-physical systems.
1 Introduction
Developing systems satisfying their desirable properties is a
non-trivial task. Formal methods have been seen as a pos-
sible solution to the problem. Given the increasing com-
plexity of systems, many formal methods adopt refinement
techniques, where systems are developed step-by-step in a
property preserving manner. In this way, a system’s details
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are gradually introduced into its design within a hierarchical
development.
System properties are often categorised into two classes:
safety and liveness [15]. A safety property ensures that unde-
sirable behaviours will never happen during system execu-
tions. A liveness property guarantees that eventually desir-
able behaviours will happen. Ideally, systems should be de-
veloped in such a way that they satisfy both their safety and
liveness requirements. Although safety properties are often
considered the more important ones, we argue that having
live systems is also important. A system that is safe but not
live can be useless. For example, consider an elevator system
that does not move. Such an elevator system is safe (nobody
gets hurt), yet worthless. According to a survey [8], liveness
properties (in terms of existence and progress) amount to
45% of the overall system properties.
1.1 Motivation
In many refinement-based developmentmethods (e.g., B [1],
Event-B [2], VDM [14], Z [22]), the focus is on preserv-
ing safety properties. A common problem for such safety-
oriented methods is that when applying them to the design
of a system, it is possible to make the design so safe that
it becomes unusable. This would happen if we strengthened
the guards of the events (in Event-B) or choose strong pre-
conditions (in B, Z, VDM) to facilitate the proof of safety
properties but in such a way that, in cases where the op-
erations or events are needed to make the system progress,
they are not enabled. Concretely, in an elevator system, this
might result in a controller which eventually stops opening
the door to the elevator (possibly despite there being people
inside) in order to satisfy the safety property that the door
not be opened between floors. It is hence our aim to design
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a refinement framework preserving both safety and liveness
properties.
UNITY [4] has a calculus for liveness but does not sup-
port refinement of programs. Specifications are written in
the UNITY logic (a subset of temporal logic) and implemen-
tations are programs (or transition systems). The initial spec-
ification can be refined by a stronger set of temporal proper-
ties but once the temporal properties are implemented, fur-
ther refinement of the programs is not possible.
Event-B [2] has a calculus for refinement of safety prop-
erties, but does not provide much support for liveness and
fairness. Instead, Event-B provides the notion of conver-
gence. In a system, a set of events are convergent if they
cannot prevent the other events from happening. This can
be used, for instance, to develop model of a sequential pro-
gram, to prove that the program terminates. Convergence is
proven by choosing a variant for the system, i.e., an expres-
sion whose type is well ordered (e.g., natural numbers or fi-
nite sets). Then, it must be proved that all convergent events
are guaranteed to decrease the variant whenever they are ex-
ecuted.
In Event-B, liveness properties cannot be directly ex-
pressed and proved. One justifies the validity of a liveness
property (e.g. ♦evt, i.e., infinitely often, event evt occurs)
by showing that the system is deadlock free and that events
other than evt are convergent. However, one must show that
deadlock freedom is preserved in each following refinement,
and that all new events are convergent. If a spontaneous
event (i.e. non-convergent) is needed in a refinement (e.g.,
an event representing an environmental action), liveness is
no longer preserved. Also, only one liveness property per
system can be supported.
Our Unit-B method [11] is inspired by the treatment
of liveness in UNITY and refinement in Event-B. It im-
proves on both methods by offering a notion of refinement
that preserves liveness applicable to reactive and distributed
systems. It does this by the introduction of coarse and fine
schedules on events and event indices.
In the subsequent, we present a small example to con-
trast Event-B’s safety-based style of reasoningwith Unit-B’s
liveness-driven style. We present two high level models (one
in Event-B and the other in Unit-B) of a mutual exclusion
protocol. In each model, we show the important safety and
liveness properties that one can prove. More specifically, we
study three requirements (1) mutual exclusion (safety), (2)
minimal progress and (3) individual progress.
1.1.1 An Event-B Model
The Event-B model, in Figure 1, formalises a set of pro-
cesses (Pcs) each of which is in one of three states: idle,
waiting, and cs (i.e., in their critical section). The state of
every process is recorded in the (global) variable st (see in-
variables : st
invariants :
inv0 : st ∈ Pcs→{idle,waiting,cs}
inv1 : (∀ p,q : p 6= q : ¬(st.p= cs∧ st.q= cs))
events :
request =̂ status convergent
any p where st.p= idle then st.p := waiting end
enter =̂ status ordinary
any p where st.p= waiting∧ (∀q : p 6= q : st.q 6= cs) then
st.p := cs
end
exit =̂ status convergent
any p where st.p= cs then st.p := idle end
Note: p,q ∈ Pcs is implicitly assumed.
Fig. 1 Event-B mutual exclusion specification
variant inv0). The safety requirement of the protocol, that of
mutual exclusion, is captured by invariant inv1 and can be
proved at this level of abstraction.
In order to reason about liveness in this Event-B system,
we need a variant. The variant is chosen on the basis of the
exact property that we want to demonstrate. We are inter-
ested in proving continuous progress, i.e., as long as there
are processes waiting to enter their critical section, some
process will get to enter. In linear time temporal logic, this
is formulated as:
( (∃ p :: st.p= waiting) ⇒ ♦(∃ p :: st.p= cs) ) (prg0)
In this property, the p in st.p=waiting and the p in st.p= cs
are not necessarily the same and individual processes might
wait forever. There are two ways in which an execution of
the Event-B model might fail to satisfy this (weak) liveness
property:
1. The system executes forever but, after a point where some
processes are waiting, only events request and exit are
taken.
2. The system deadlocks, i.e. terminates, in a state where
some processes are still waiting.
Issue 1 can be addressed by using the following vari-
ant and by making events request and exit convergent (as in
Figure 1).
variant : 2× (# p :: st.p= cs) + (# p :: st.p= idle)
In the above expression, the notation (# x : R : T ), the count-
ing quantifier, is used to designate the number of values of
x that satisfy T given that they satisfy R. Convergent events
are required to decrease this natural number variant. Event
exit decreases the first term by 2 and increases the second
term by 1 while event request decreases the second term and
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leaves the first term unchanged. The two events are therefore
convergent.
This line of reasoning proves that any (possibly partial)
execution of the system where enter is not executed must be
finite. It also follows that any infinite execution of the model
includes an infinite number of occurrences of enter. In this
case, it means that enter has to occur infinitely many times
in infinite executions.
Issue 2 is addressed by ensuring that, at any time, there
is at least one enabled event. This is known as a proof of
deadlock freedom.
dlf : (∃ p :: st.p= idle) // request
∨
(
∃ p ::
st.p= waiting
∧ (∀q : q 6= p : st.q 6= cs)
)
// enter
∨ (∃ p :: st.p= cs) // exit
In this small system, deadlock freedom is easy to prove.
However, the size of its formulation grows with the number
of events of the system and it cannot, in general, be broken
down into smaller proof obligations.
In addition, the (weak) liveness property (prg0) is not au-
tomatically satisfied by refinements of the system. In order
to preserve it, we need to make convergent all the events in-
troduced in successive refinements and we need to prove rel-
ative deadlock freedom at each level of abstraction, a burden
that only grows more daunting as a development progresses.
As mentioned earlier, this does not prove individual pro-
gress of the processes involved in the protocol. We would
like to prove the following (strong) liveness property:
(∀ p :: ( st.p= waiting ⇒ ♦st.p= cs ))
i.e., every process waiting eventually enters its critical sec-
tion. It is not possible to prove such individual progress us-
ing the Event-B model of Figure 1. In order to do such a
proof, we would need to include in the model a description
of a scheduler. In other words, a low level design is neces-
sary even for a high level liveness property. This is contrary
to the idea of refinement: properties should be provable at
the level of abstraction and the level of details to which they
pertain. This is what Unit-B accomplishes.
Notational Convention. The examples in this paper rely heav-
ily on discrete mathematics and predicate calculus. With the
exception of function application,we borrow the set-theoretic
and relational notation from the Event-B book [2]; function
application, written f .x with f the function and x the argu-
ment, as well predicate calculus and generalized quantifier
notation are taken from E.W. Dijkstra [6].
In Dijkstra’s relativised quantifier notation, (∀ x : R : T )
and (∃ x : R : T ), with R the range of the quantifications and
T the term, are equivalent to the more common (∀x • R⇒
T ) and (∃x • R∧T ). The notation for Temporal Logic is
taken from [17].
events :
request [p] =̂
when st.p= idle then st.p := waiting end
enter [p] =̂
during st.p= waiting upon (∀q : p 6= q : st.q 6= cs) begin
st.p := cs
end
exit [p] =̂
during st.p= cs begin st.p := idle end
Fig. 2 Unit-B mutual exclusion specification
1.1.2 A Unit-B Model
Figure 2 shows a Unit-B model for the same problem as
Figure 1. The Unit-B has the same set of variables and in-
variants as the Event-B model from Figure 1. Figure 2 only
shows the events of the Unit-B model.
In addition to the Event-B constructs, the Unit-B model
features three new ones: event coarse schedules, introduced
by the keyword during; event fine schedules, introduced by
the keyword upon and event indices, denoted by the square
brackets next the the event names. Intuitively, if the coarse
schedules of an event hold continually and its fine sched-
ules becomes true infinitely often then the event is executed
infinitely often.
For all events (i.e., request, enter, exit) , p is an index
instead of an Event-B parameter (declared with the keyword
any). While a parameter is conceptually a value chosen non-
deterministically, an index suggests that there exists a dis-
tinct version of the event, including a separate scheduling
assumption, for every one of the index’s values. This allows
us to prove individual progress for each process p.
Event request is syntatically similar to its Event-B counter
part. Semantically, the difference is subtle but important. In
Event-B, if request is the only enabled event, i.e. its guard
is true and the guard of every of other event is false, request
will be taken eventually. In Unit-B, even if request is the
only enabled event, it might never occur. This is because
request is not scheduled: it features neither a coarse sched-
ule (declared with during) nor a fine schedule (declared with
upon).
Events enter and exit are scheduled events: enter has
both a coarse schedule and a fine schedule and exit has only
a coarse schedule. In the case of exit, when its coarse sched-
ule is continually true, i.e. some process is in its critical
section and remains there, then eventually exit is taken and
p exits its critical section. Event enter is eventually taken
if a process p is waiting continually (coarse schedule) and
that infinitely often no process is in its critical section (fine
schedule). The fine schedule ensures that enter occurs de-
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spite the other processes going in and out of their critical
sections.
The notion of schedule allows us to prove that certain
events are guaranteed to occur without having to reference
the other events. This is in contrast to Event-B where the
only way to ensure that enter is taken is to make sure that it
is eventually the only event enabled.
The next step is to formulate the liveness requirement.
In UNITY logic, on which Unit-B is based, the absence of
livelock (i.e. prg0) is formulated as:
(∃ p :: st.p = waiting)  (∃ p :: st.p = cs) .
It reads “whenever a process is waiting it eventually follows
that a process, possibly a different one, will gain access to
its critical section.”
Although the absence of livelock is an interesting prop-
erty, it is too weak to be useful; the goal of the processes is
not to allow an arbitrary other process to carry on with its
work; it is rather the goal of the mutual exclusion protocol
to let the processes go about their business unhindered, in-
dependently from each other. This means that it is more im-
portant for the purpose of each process not to be left to wait
forever than any other property that has to do with the com-
peting processes. Therefore, we choose individual progress
as the central property to be proved. Its UNITY formulation
is:
st.p= waiting  st.p= cs (prg1)
The free variable p is implicitly universally quantified over
the whole formula.
In the process of proving (prg1), we will discover that
another progress property is required. This is because the
only way that every process can safely have a turn in their
critical section is for no process to linger in theirs forever.
We formulate it as (prg2) and prove it first:
true  (∀ p :: ¬st.p= cs) (prg2)
It reads “infinitely often, every process will be simultane-
ously out of their critical section.” In LTL, they are stated
as:
(∀ p :: ( st.p= waiting ⇒ ♦st.p= cs )) (prg1′)
♦(∀ p :: ¬st.p= cs) (prg2′)
The standard way of proving a liveness property in Unit-
B is to use rules fromUNITY logic to transform the property
into something that is more easily proved using the events.
The rules will be explained in more details in Section 3. For
the sake of conciseness, we only sketch the intuition behind
the proofs of this example.
A sketched proof of (prg2) As long as (∀ p :: ¬st.p= cs)
does not hold, there exists a process p is in its critical sec-
tion, i.e., the coarse schedule of exit[p] is true. Therefore, ac-
cording to its scheduling assumption, exit[p] eventually will,
thus establishing (∀ p :: ¬st.p= cs) in the process thanks to
the mutual exclusion invariant, inv1.
A sketched proof of (prg1) Given a process p, enter[p] is
the only event that can establish st.p = cs and it does so if
st.p = waiting (its coarse schedule) holds continuously and
(∀q : p 6= q : ¬st.q= cs) (its fine schedule) is true infinitely
many times. The latter is entailed by (prg2) which we al-
ready proved. The former condition is satisfied as soon as
st.p = waiting (the antecedent of (prg1)) is established. .
It is very important to note that the index p allows us to
specify the scheduling assumptions on a process-by-process
basis. We can thus assert and prove that every process will
eventually acquire the lock (prg1), a property otherwise known
as starvation freedom. This property cannot be proved in
Event-B. In Event-B we can only prove the weaker property
(prg0) that some arbitrary process will eventually acquire
the lock.
Traditionally, scheduling assumptions fall into two cat-
egories: weak fairness and strong fairness. In this example,
weak fairness (stating that if a process p is waiting and the
lock is free continually then p eventually takes the lock) is
insufficient to prove that process p eventually takes the lock.
Normally, to prove this property, the enter[p] event would be
scheduled with strong fairness (stating that if a process p is
waiting and the lock is free infinitely often then p eventu-
ally holds the lock). Using strong fairness, the coarse sched-
ule (conditions required to hold continually) and the fine
schedule (conditions required to become true infinitely of-
ten) would be wrapped in a single guard, thus intertwining
the reasoning about those two aspects. By decoupling these
orthogonal considerations, we can reason about process p
waiting separately from the lock becoming free. Moreover,
during refinement, this decoupling will allow us to trade
freely between the coarse and the fine schedules. The dis-
tinction between coarse and fine schedules and their rela-
tion to other scheduling assumptions are explained further
in Section 3 and Section 4.4.
The combination of the progress preserving refinement
calculus with the novel notions of coarse and fine schedules
makes it possible in Unit-B to introduce liveness properties
at any stage of a development process. Reasoning about both
safety and liveness can be done at the relevant abstractions.
As a consequence, not only do we use liveness requirements
to rule out any design decision that would be too conserva-
tive, but we also use them to guide us to the right design
decisions. As a result, liveness properties, in particular pro-
gress properties, drive the development process.
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1.2 Contribution
This paper features a formal semantics for Unit-B models
and their properties, alongside an example of application of
Unit-B to a non- trivial control problem. The semantics is
formulated in computation calculus [7]. We use it to for-
mally prove the soundness of the rules for reasoning about
temporal properties and refinement relationships in Unit-B.
In the past, Unit-B has been used to design a mutual ex-
clusion algorithm [11] and a signal controller for a train sta-
tion [13]. This paper is an extended version of the latter. In
addition to the contributions of [13], we (1) strengthen the
separation between the formal semantics and the proof obli-
gations; (2) present a new rule permitting the reuse of pro-
gress properties without reproving them; (3) formulate the
refinement rules so as to allow the refinement of events to
be justified using only one rule; (4) elaborate the individual
refinement steps of the example with the design concerns
that guide it and the specific proof obligations; (5) expand
the example with two refinement steps leading to the speci-
fication of a controller and (6) illustrate the use of inductive
proofs of liveness in the example.
1.3 Structure
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we
review Dijkstra’s computation calculus [7] which we used to
formulate our semantics and design our proofs. We follow
with a description of the Unit-B method in Section 3. We
demonstrate the method and its refinement rules by develop-
ing a signal control system in Section 4. We summarise our
work in Section 5 including discussion about related work
and future work.
2 Background: Computation Calculus
In this section, we give a brief introduction to computation
calculus, based on [7]. This will be the basis for defining
the semantics of Unit-B models, defining the semantics of
temporal properties (both safety and liveness) and formulat-
ing the proof of soundness of the Unit-B refinement rules in
Section 3.
– In Section 2.1, we introduce the notion of computation
predicates which can be manipulated algebraically. We
use them in Section 3 to characterize the execution of
Unit-B models as well as their properties.
– In Section 2.2, we introduce state predicates, a special
case of computation predicates which we use in Sec-
tion 3 to formalizeUnit-B invariants, progress and safety
properties, events’ guards and schedules.
– In Section 2.3, we introduce atomic computation predi-
cates, a special case of computation predicates which we
use in Section 3 to formalize the meaning of the events’
actions.
Let S be the state space: a non-empty set of “states”.
Let C be the computation space: a set of non-empty (fi-
nite or infinite) sequences of states henceforth referred to
as “computations”.
2.1 Computation Predicates
Definition 1 (Computation Predicates) The set of compu-
tation predicates CPred is defined as follows:
CPred = C →B , (1)
i.e., functions from computations to Booleans.
The standard Boolean operators of the predicate calculus
are lifted, i.e., extended to apply to CPred. For example,
assuming s, t ∈CPred and τ ∈ C , we have,1
(s⇒ t).τ ≡ (s.τ ⇒ t.τ) (2)
(∀ i :: s.i).τ ≡ (∀ i :: s.i.τ) . (3)
The everywhere-operator quantifies universally over all
computations, i.e.,
[ s ] ≡ (∀ τ :: s.τ) . (4)
Whenever there are no risks of ambiguity, we shall use s= t
as a shorthand for [ s≡ t ] for computation predicates s, t.
Postulate 1 CPred is a predicate algebra.
A consequence of Postulate 1 is thatCPred satisfies all pos-
tulates for the predicate calculus as defined in [5]. In par-
ticular, true (maps all computations to TRUE) and false
(maps all computations to FALSE) are the “top” and the
“bottom” elements of the complete Boolean lattice with the
order [ ⇒ ] specified by these postulates. The lattice op-
erations are denoted by various Boolean operators including
∧,∨,¬,⇒, etc.
The predicate algebra is extended with sequential com-
position as follows.
Definition 2 (Sequential Composition)
(s;t).τ ≡ (#τ = ∞∧ s.τ) ∨
(∃n : n< #τ : s.(τ ↑ n+1)∧ t.(τ ↓ n))
(5)
where #, ↑ and ↓ denote sequence operations ‘length’, ‘take’
and ‘drop’, respectively.
1 In this paper, we use f .x to denote the result of applying a function
f to argument x. Function application is left-associative, so f .x.y is the
same as ( f .x).y.
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Intuitively, the sequential composition of s and t can be un-
derstood as a program specification that requires s to be run
first and then t to be run as soon as s terminates, if it does.
More specifically, a computation τ satisfies s ;t if either it is
an infinite computation satisfying s, or τ can be broken into
a finite prefix τ ↑ n+1 and a suffix τ ↓ n sharing state τ.n
such that the prefix satisfies s and the suffix satisfies t.
In the course of reasoning using computation calculus,
we make use of the distinction between infinite (“eternal”)
and finite computations. Two constants E,F ∈ CPred have
been defined for this purpose.
Definition 3 (Eternal and Finite Computations) For any pred-
icate s,
E = true; false (6)
F = ¬E (7)
s is eternal ≡ [ s ⇒ E ] (8)
s is finite ≡ [ s ⇒ F ] (9)
An important property related to E (from [7]) is that for any
predicate s, we have
s; false = s∧E . (10)
Given F, the temporal “eventually” operator (i.e.,♦) can
be formulated as F;s. The “always” operatorG is defined as
the dual of the “eventually” operator.
Definition 4 (Always Operator) For any predicate s,
Gs = ¬(F;¬s) . (11)
Important properties of G are that it is strengthening (12),
monotonic (13), and it distributes over conjunction (14). For
any predicates s and t, we have:
[Gs ⇒ s ] , (12)
[ s ⇒ t ] ⇒ [Gs ⇒ G t ] , (13)
G(s ∧ t) = Gs ∧ G t . (14)
A useful technique that is frequently applied is to strip
all the outerG in some proofs, as illustrated in the following
example. For any predicates s, t, and u, we have
[ s∧ t ⇒ u ] ⇒ [Gs ⇒ (G t⇒Gu) ] . (15)
The proof of (15) is as follows.
[Gs ⇒ (G t⇒Gu) ]
= { shunting }
[Gs∧G t ⇒ Gu ]
= { G distributes through ∧ (14) }
[G(s∧ t) ⇒ Gu ]
⇐ { monotonicity (13) }
[ s∧ t ⇒ u ]
According to (15), whenever we need to prove a formula
of the form [Gs ⇒ (G t⇒Gu) ] , we can reformulate it to
strip the outer G ’s and manipulate s,t and u on their own to
simplify the proof.
Definition 5 (Persistence) For any predicate s,
s is persistent ≡ s=Gs . (16)
A persistent predicate describes some repetitive mosaic. If a
persistent s can be used to describe a computation τ , s can
also be used to describe every suffix of τ . We borrow the
following facts related to the notion of persistence from [7].
For all predicates s, t, and persistent u, we have
Gs is persistent, and (17)
[ u ⇒ (s ;t ≡ s ;(t ∧u)) ] . (18)
Consider some computation predicate r where Gr holds,
(17) ensures that Gr is persistent, and (18) (together with
(12)) enables us to insert r after any sub-computation in a
series of sequential compositions. This is particularly useful
when r is an invariant, i.e., r = p; true, where p is a state
predicate as defined in the subsequent.
2.2 State Predicates
A constant 1 is defined as the (left- and right-) neutral ele-
ment for sequential composition.
Definition 6 (Constant 1) For any computation τ ,
1.τ ≡ #τ = 1 (19)
An important property of 1 is that it is finite, i.e.,
[ 1⇒F ] . (20)
In fact, 1 is the characteristic predicate of the state space.
Moreover, we choose not to distinguish between a single
state and the singleton computation consisting of that state,
which allows us to identify predicates of one state with the
predicates that hold only for singleton computations. Let us
denote the set of state predicates by SPred.
Definition 7 (State Predicate) For any predicate p,
p ∈ SPred ≡ [ p⇒ 1 ] . (21)
A consequence of this definition is that SPred is also a
complete Boolean lattice with the order [ ⇒ ], with 1 and
false being the “top” and “bottom” elements. It inherits all
the lattice operators that it is closed under: conjunction, dis-
junction, and existential quantification. The other lattice op-
erations, i.e., negation and universal quantification, are de-
fined by restricting the corresponding operators onCPred to
state predicates. We only use state predicate negation in this
paper.
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Definition 8 (State predicate negation∼) For any state pred-
icate p,
∼ p = ¬p∧1 . (22)
For a state predicate p, the set of computations with the
initial state satisfying p is captured by p ; true: the weak-
est such predicate. A special notation • : SPred→CPred is
introduced to denote this predicate.
Definition 9 (Initially Operator •) For any state predicate
p,
•p = p ; true . (23)
This entails the validity of the following rule, which we
will use anonymously in the rest of the paper: for p,q two
state predicates,
p ;q = p∧q . (24)
Another common rule related to state predicate is the state
restriction rule allowing to trade∧ and • for ; and vice versa.
Given any predicate s and any state predicate p, we have
p ;s = s∧•p . (25)
2.3 Atomic Actions
An important operator in LTL is the “next-time operator”.
This is captured in computation calculus by the notion of
atomic computations: computations of length 2. A constant
X ∈CPred is defined for this purpose.
Definition 10 (Atomic Actions) For any computation τ and
predicate a,
X.τ ≡ #τ = 2 (26)
a is an atomic action ≡ [ a⇒X ] (27)
Given the above definition, the “next” operator can be ex-
pressed as X ;s for arbitrary computation s. An important
property for X is that it is finite, i.e.,
[ X⇒F ] . (28)
3 The Unit-B Method
This section presents our contribution: the Unit-B method.
It is inspired by Event-B [2] and UNITY [4].
Similar to Event-B, Unit-B is aimed at the design of
software systems by stepwise refinement, where each step
is verified via the application of correctness preserving re-
finement rules. It differs from Event-B by its capability for
reasoning about progress properties and by its refinement or-
der which preserves liveness properties. It also differs from
UNITY by unifying the notions of programs and specifica-
tions, allowing stepwise refinement of programs from ab-
stract models.
– In Section 3.1, we briefly review the syntax of Unit-B
models (which has been informally introduced earlier in
Section 1.1.2).
– In Section 3.2, we describe the semantics of a Unit-B
model M. We characterize the set of executions of M
by a computation predicate ex.M which is the conjunc-
tion of a safety and a liveness component. We provide
proof rules for invariant preservation and unless proper-
ties. We also show the that the proof rules are sound with
respect to the semantics.
– In Section 3.3, we provide proof rules for progress prop-
erties and prove their soundness.
– In Section 3.4, we provide refinement rules and prove
their soundness with respect to the semantics.
A more extensive discussion of the soundness of the
proof rules of Unit-B is presented in [11].
3.1 Syntax
Similar to Event-B, a Unit-B system is modelled by a transi-
tion system, where the state space is captured by variables v
and the transitions are modelled by guarded events. Further-
more, Unit-B has additional assumptions on how the events
should be scheduled. Using an Event-B-similar syntax, a
Unit-B event has the following form:
e [i] =̂ during c.i.v upon f .i.v
when g.i.v then s.i.v.v′ end
(29)
where i are the event’s indices, g is the event’s guard, c is the
event’s coarse schedule, f is the event’s fine schedule, and s
is the event’s action changing state variables v. The action is
usually made up of several assignments, either deterministic
(:=) or non-deterministic (:| or :∈). An event ewith indices i
stands for multiple events. Each corresponds to several non-
indexed events e.i, one for each possible value of the indices
i. Here g, c, f are state predicates. An event e is said to be
enabled when its guard g holds. The scheduling assumption
of the event is specified by c and f as follows: if c holds
continually and f becomes true infinitely often then event e is
carried out infinitely often. An event without any scheduling
assumption will have its coarse schedule c equal to false.
An event having only the coarse schedule c will have the
fine schedule to be 1. Vice versa, an event having only the
fine schedule f will have the coarse schedule to be 1.
In addition to the variables and the events, a model has
an initialisation state predicate init constraining the initial
value of the state variables. All computations of a model
start from a state satisfying the initialisation and are such
that, at every step, either one of its enabled events occurs
or the state is unchanged, and each computation satisfies the
scheduling assumptions of all events.
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3.2 Semantics
In the following, we use computation calculus to give the
formal semantics of Unit-Bmodels. LetM be a Unit-Bmodel
containing a set of events of the form (29) and an initialisa-
tion predicate init. Since the action of the event can be de-
scribed by a before-after predicate s.i.v.v′, it corresponds to
an atomic action
S.i = (∀ x :: •(x= v) ⇒ X ;s.i.x.v) . (30)
In the above, the quantified variable x is introduced to cap-
ture the before value of v, hence allows us to relate the pre-
state and the post-state using the state predicate s.i.x.v ap-
plied to the post-state (as indicated by X ; ). Given that an
event e.i can only be carried out when it is enabled, we for-
mulate the effect of each event execution as follows:
act.(e.i) = g.i ; S.i . (31)
The semantics ofM is given by a computation predicate
ex.M which is a conjunction of a “safety part” saf .M and a
“liveness part” live.M (both to be defined later), i.e.,
[ ex.M ≡ saf .M ∧ live.M ] . (32)
Definition 11 A property s is satisfied byM, denotedM |= s,
if the property is implied by ex.M.
M |= s if and only if [ ex.M ⇒ s ] . (33)
We useM ⊢ s to denote thatM |= s is provable.
Properties of Unit-B models are captured by two types
of properties: safety and progress (liveness).
3.2.1 Safety
Below, we define the general form of one step of execution
of modelM, i.e., step.M, and the safety constraints saf .M on
its complete computations.
[ step.M ≡ (∃ e, i : e.i ∈M : act.(e.i)) ∨ Skip ] (34)
[ saf .M ≡ • init∧G(step.M ; true) ] (35)
where Skip is a special unscheduled event that is a part of
every model. Its guard is true and its effect is to leave all
the variables of model unchanged. Since the variables of the
current model may be only one of the components of the
state space — the other components being the variables of
the models that may refine the current one — Skip makes
no commitment about the final value of those components;
that is to say that they will be changed non-deterministically
without constraints.
Safety properties of the model are captured by invari-
ance properties (also called invariants) and by unless prop-
erties.
Invariance properties An invariant I.v is a state-property
that holds at every reachable state of the model. If I.v is an
invariant ofM, in all executions ofM, I.v holds forever:
[ ex.M ⇒ G •I ] . (36)
In particular, we rely solely on the safety part of the model to
prove invariance properties, i.e., we prove [ saf .M ⇒ G •I ].
This leads to the well-known invariance principle.
⊢ init.v ⇒ I.v
⊢ I.v∧g.i.v∧ s.i.v.v′ ⇒ I.v′ (for all event e.i)
M ⊢ G • I
(INV)
Invariance properties are important for reasoning about the
correctness of the models since they give an (over-)approximation
of the set of reachable states. This makes it possible to use
invariance properties as additional assumptions in proofs for
other properties (often as a consequence of applying (17)
and (18)). For example, we can propagate a state predicate
I to the middle of a sequential composition s;t as follows:
under the assumption that I holds forever, i.e., G • I, either
because it is an invariant or for other reasons, for any predi-
cates s and t, we have
s ;t = s ; I ;t (37)
The proof of (37) is as follows.
s;t
= { G • I (persistent) with persistence rule (18) }
s;(t ∧G • I)
= { G is strengthening (12) }
s;(t ∧•I∧G • I)
= { G • I (persistent) with persistence rule (18) }
s;(t ∧•I)
= { state restriction (25) }
s; I;t
In the subsequent, we assume that model M has an in-
variant I.v.
Unless properties The other important class of safety prop-
erties is defined by the unless operator un.
Definition 12 (un operator) For any state predicates p, q,
[ (punq) ≡ G(•p ⇒ (G •p) ;(1∨X) ;•q) ] (38)
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Informally, punq is a safety property stating that if condi-
tion p holds then it will hold continuously unless q becomes
true. The formula (1∨X) is used in (38) to allow the last
state where p holds and the state where q first holds to either
be the same state or to immediately follow one another.
The following theorem is used for proving that a Unit-B
model satisfies an unless property.
Theorem 1 (Unless rule) Consider a modelM with invari-
ant I and an unless property p.vunq.v. We have
[ ex.M ⇒ punq ]
if for every event e and index value i with e.i ∈M,
[ (I∧ p∧∼q);act.(e.i) ⇒ X;(p∨q) ] . (39)
Proof (Sketch) Condition (39) ensures that every event e.i
of M either maintains p or establishes q. By induction, we
can see that the only way for p to become false after a state
where it was true is that either q becomes true or that it
was already true. The full proof can be found in [11, Sec-
tion 2.0.1] ⊓⊔
It follows from Theorem 1 that the following proof rule
can be used to prove unless properties.
⊢
p.v ∧ ¬q.v ∧ I.v ∧
g.i.v ∧ s.i.v.v′
⇒ p.v′ ∨ q.v′ (for all event e.i)
M ⊢ p un q
(UN)
The antecedent of (UN) has the interesting peculiarity that
it does not include either the fine or the coarse schedule of
event e.
3.2.2 Liveness
For each event of the form (29), its schedule sched.(e.i) is
formulated as follows, where c and f are the event’s coarse
and fine schedule, respectively:
sched.(e.i) ≡ G

 G •c.i ∧ GF ;•f .i⇒
F ; f .i ;act.(e.i) ; true



 . (SCH)
Intuitively, (SCH) states that if the coarse schedule c holds
continually, i.e., G • c and the fine schedule f becomes true
infinitely often, i.e., GF;•f , then eventually e.i occurs at a
point where f holds, i.e., F; f ;act.(e.i). To ensure that the
event e.i only occurs when its guard g.i holds, we require
the following feasibility condition:
I.v∧ c.i.v∧ f .i.v ⇒ g.i.v (SCH FIS)
In absence of this condition, the (coarse or fine) schedule
may be continuously in contradiction with the guard: while
the scheduling constraint (SCH) states that all valid compu-
tation will include occurrences of the event, the safety con-
straint (35) states that, under the same conditions, the event
will not happen. It follows that no traces satisfy the two con-
straints and the system cannot be implemented.
Our coarse and fine schedules are a generalisation of
the standard weak-fairness and strong-fairness assumptions.
The standard weak-fairness assumption for event e.i (stat-
ing that if e.i is enabled continually then eventually it will
be taken) can be formulated by using c= g and f = 1. Simi-
larly, the standard strong-fairness assumption for e.i (stating
that if e.i is enabled infinitely often then eventually it will be
taken) can be formulated by using c= 1 and f = g.
[ wf.(e.i) ≡ G(G • g.i ⇒ F;act.(e.i); true) ]
[ sf.(e.i) ≡ G(GF;•g.i ⇒ F;act.(e.i); true) ]
Instead of categorizing Unit-B events between weakly
fair and strongly fair, our generalization allows us to have a
little of both in every event. Strong fairness is often a nice
abstraction of scheduling magic happening under the hood
but it is necessary to refine it away in order to implement it.
Our generalization facilitates this by making the transition
between strong fairness to weak fairness smoother.
In Section 4.4.1, we provide a methodological compar-
ison between weak and strong fairness on one hand and
coarse and fine schedules on the other hand in the context
of the main example. Furthermore, in Section 4.4 we dis-
cuss the heuristics justifying the choice of coarse and fine
schedules of events.
The liveness part of the model is the conjunction of the
schedules for its events, i.e.,
[ live.M ≡ (∀ e, i : e.i ∈M : sched.(e.i)) ] (40)
The summary of the Unit-B modelling notation is showed in
Figure 3.
e [i] =̂ during c.i.v upon f .i.v
when g.i.v then s.i.v.v′ end
[ ex.M ≡ saf .M ∧ live.M ]
[ saf .M ≡ • init ∧ G(step.M; true) ]
[ step.M ≡ (∃e, i : e.i ∈M : act.(e.i)) ∨ Skip ]
[ act.(e.i) ≡ g.i. ; S.i ]
[ S.i.t ≡ (∀ x :: •(x = v) ⇒ X ; s.i.x.v) ]
[ live.M ≡ (∀e, i : e.i ∈M : sched.(e.i)) ]
[ sched.(e.i) ≡ G(G •c.i ∧ GF ;•f .i ⇒ F ; f .i ;act.(e.i) ; true) ]
M |= s iff [ ex.M ⇒ s ]
Fig. 3 Summary of Unit-B
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3.3 Progress Properties
Progress properties are of the form p q, where is the
leads-to operator. They state that every state satisfying pred-
icate p is eventually followed by by a state satisfying q.
Definition 13 ( operator) For any state predicates p, q,
[ (p q) ≡ G(•p ⇒ F ;•q) ] (41)
In the case where p and q contain free variables, i.e., vari-
ables not belonging to the state space, p q is understood
implicitly as
(∀ x :: p q)
with x the tuple of all the free variables appearing in either
p or q. The same principle is applied to unless, transient and
falsifies properties, the last two are introduced later in this
section.
A special kind of progress properties is captured by the
transient operator. Transient property tr p states that when-
ever predicate p holds, it is eventually falsified. Transient
properties are especially useful for creating a bridge between
leads- to properties and the events that effect them. That
bridge is completed by the falsifies operator which we in-
troduce later in this section.
Definition 14 (tr operator) For any state predicate p,
tr p = p ∼ p = 1 ∼ p = GF;• ∼ p (42)
The properties of and tr that we will use in this paper
are as follows. For any state predicates p, q, and r, we have:
[G •(p⇒q) ⇒ (p q) ] (Implication)
[ (p q) ∧ (q r) ⇒ (p r) ] (Transitivity)
[ (p q) ≡ (p∧∼q  q) ] (Split-Off-Skip)
[ (p un q) ∧ (tr p∧ ∼q) ⇒ (p q) ] (Ensure)[
(p ∧ v=M  (p ∧ v<M) ∨ q)
⇒ (p  q)
]
(Induction)
[
(p  q) ∧ (r un b)
⇒ (p∧ r  (q∧ r)∨b)
]
(PSP)
Above, in the induction rule, M is a free variable and v
is the variant, an expression involving some state variables.
The name of the (PSP) rule stands for Progress, Safety, Pro-
gress. Except for (Split-Off-Skip), the above rules are taken
from [4].
We prove progress properties by relating them to the
events of the model with falsifies properties. We can es-
tablish tr p by choosing an event e of the model and proving
e falsifies p, i.e., if p holds continually e is eventually taken
and whenever e is executed in a state where p holds it falsi-
fies p.
Definition 15 ( falsifies operator) For any state predicate
p and any event as follows.:
e [i] =̂ during c.i.v upon f .i.v
when g.i.v then s.i.v.v′ end
Event e with (actual) index i falsifies property p (denoted as
e.i falsifies p) if under condition p, e.i negates p in one step
(NEG), the coarse schedule c is enabled (C EN), and the
fine schedule f is eventually enabled (F EN).
[ e.i falsifies p ≡ (NEG) ∧ (C EN) ∧ (F EN) ] , (43)
where
G ((p∧ c∧ f ); act.(e.i) ; true ⇒ X ;• ∼ p) , (NEG)
G •(p ⇒ c) , (C EN)
p∧ c  f . (F EN)
Property e.i falsifies p states that, when state predicate p
holds, if it is not falsified by events other than e.i, e.i will
eventually occur and falsify p.
Given the definition of falsifies , we have the following
proof rule (taking into account the invariant I.v).
⊢ I.v∧ p.v ∧ c.i.v ∧ f .i.v ∧ s.i.v.v′ ⇒ ¬p.v′
⊢ I.v∧ p.v ⇒ c.v
M ⊢ p.v∧ c.i.v  f .i.v
M ⊢ e.i falsifies p.v
(FLS)
The falsifies properties are the main tool for linking the
model and the progress properties in Unit-B. The attractive-
ness of such properties is that we can implement them using
a single event. In the case of events without a fine schedule
(i.e., f is 1), which is the most common one, the last condi-
tion (F EN) becomes trivial and can be omitted.
Theorem 2 (Transient rule) Consider state predicate p and
a modelM contains event e.
e [i] =̂ during c.i.v upon f .i.v
when g.i.v then s.i.v.v′ end
Given an (actual) index i, we have
[ ex.M ⇒ tr p ] if [ ex.M ⇒ e.i falsifies p ] .
Proof Unfolding the definitions of tr and falsifies , we prove
GF;•∼p under the assumptions (NEG), (C EN) and (F EN).
Moreover, since e is an event inM, we have [ ex.M⇒ sched.(e.i) ] .
Therefore we have sched.(e.i) as an additional assumption.
Dropping the outer G in the goal and in the assump-
tions (similar to (15)), our goal becomes F;• ∼ p. Addition-
ally, since [ ¬s⇒ s ≡ s ] for any computation predicate s,
we discharge our obligation by strengthening F ; •∼ p to its
negation,G •p.
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F ;•∼ p
⇐ { [ F ;X⇒F ], aiming for (NEG) }
F ;X ;•∼ p
⇐ { (NEG) }
F ;(p∧ c∧ f ) ;act.(e.i) ; true
⇐ { property of G (37) }
F; f ;act.(e.i);true ∧ G •c ∧ G •p
⇐ { sched.(e.i) and definition (SCH) }
GF;• f ∧ G •c ∧ G •p
= { G distributes through ∧ (14)}
G( F;• f ∧ •(c∧ p) )
= { (F EN) }
G •(c∧ p)
= { (C EN) }
G •p
⊓⊔
Theorem 2 corresponds to the following proof rule.
M ⊢ e.i falsifies p
M ⊢ tr p
(TRS)
3.4 Refinement
In this section, we develop rules for refining Unit-B models
such that safety and liveness properties are preserved. Con-
sider models M and N. Refinement, denoted by M ⊑ N is
defined by:
M ⊑ N ≡ [ ex.M ⇐ ex.N ] . (REF)
We callM the abstract model andN the concrete model. As a
result of this definition, any property ofM is also satisfied by
N. Similarly to Event-B, refinement is considered in Unit-B
on a per event basis. Each abstract event ea is refined by a
concrete event ec.
ea [i] =̂ during ca.i.v upon fa.i.v
when ga.i.v then s.i.v.v
′ end
(44)
ec [j] =̂ during cc.j.v upon fc.j.v
when gc.j.v then s.j.v.v
′ end
(45)
We say that ec refines ea if(
∀ j ::
(
∃i :: [ex.N ⇒
(act.(ec.j)⇒act.(ea.i)) ]
))
(EVT SAFE)(
∀ i ::
(
∃j :: [ex.N ⇒
(sched.(ec.j)⇒ sched.(ea.i)) ]
))
(EVT LIVE)
The proof that N refines M (i.e., (REF)) given condi-
tions (EVT SAFE) and (EVT LIVE) is left out. A special
case of event refinement is when the concrete event ec is a
new event. In this case, we prove that ec is the refinement
of the special Skip event which is unscheduled and does not
change any variables of the abstract model.
Condition (EVT SAFE) leads to similar proof obliga-
tions in Event-B such as guard strengthening and simula-
tion.We focus here on expanding the condition (EVT LIVE).
We consider two cases for event refinement: (1) the ab-
stract and concrete events have the same indices, and (2) the
indices are removed from the concrete event.
Theorem 3 (Retaining Events’ Indices) Consider events ea
and ec as follows.
ea [i] =̂ during ca.i.v upon fa.i.v
when ga.i.v then s.i.v.v
′ end
(46)
ec [i] =̂ during cc.i.v upon fc.i.v
when gc.i.v then s.i.v.v
′ end
(47)
Assume (EVT SAFE) have been proved for ea and ec, i.e.,
act.(ec.i) ⇒ act.(ea.i) . (48)
Given
ca∧ fa  cc (C FLW)
cc un ∼ca (C STB)
ca∧ fa  fc (F FLW)
G • (cc∧ fc ⇒ fa) (F STR)
then
sched.(ec.i) ⇒ sched.(ea.i) (49)
Proof We first prove that the left-hand side of sched.(ea.i),
i.e.,G •ca∧GF;•fa eventually leads to the left-hand side of
sched.(ec.i), i.e., G • cc∧GF;•fc.
G(G • ca∧GF;•fa ⇒ F;(G • cc∧GF;•fc)) (50)
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Dropping the outer G from (50), we start the proof from
GF;•fa with assumption G • ca.
GF;•fa
⇒ { G • ca }
GF;•(ca∧ fa)
⇒ { (C FLW) and (F FLW) }
GF;•cc ∧ GF;•fc
⇒ { (C STB) and definition of un (38) }
GF;(G • cc);(1∨X);•¬ca ∧ GF;•fc
⇒ { G • ca }
GF;(G • cc);(1∨X);(•¬ca∧•ca) ∧ GF;•fc
⇒ { contradiction }
GF;(G • cc);(1∨X); false ∧ GF;•fc
⇒ { (1∨X); false= false }
GF;(G • cc); false ∧ GF;•fc
⇒ { property of eternal computation (10) }
GF;(G • cc)∧E ∧ GF;•fc
⇒ { weakening }
GF;(G • cc) ∧ GF;•fc
⇒ { G is strengthening (12) }
F;(G • cc) ∧ GF;•fc
⇒ { GF;•fc is persistent (17) and persistence rule (18) }
F;(G • cc ∧ GF;•fc)
Finally, the proof of (49) is as follows. Expanding the
definition of sched, we prove
G(G • ca∧GF;•fa ⇒ F; fa;act.(ea.i)) (51)
under the assumptions
G(G • cc∧GF;•fc ⇒ F; fc;act.(ec.i)) (52)
First, notice that we drop the outer G from (51), (52).
and start the proof with the left-hand side of (51).
G • ca∧GF;•fa
⇒ { (50) }
F;(G • cc∧GF;•fc))
⇒ { (52) }
F;(G • cc∧F; fc;act.(ec.i))
⇒ { invariant property (37), and F;F= F}
F;(cc∧ fc);act.(ec.i)
⇒ { (F STR) }
F; fa;act.(ec.i)
⇒ { (48) }
F; fa;act.(ea.i)
Theorem 3 leads to the following proof rule.
N ⊢ ca∧ fa  cc
N ⊢ cc un ∼ca
N ⊢ ca∧ fa  fc
⊢ Ic∧ cc∧ fc ⇒ fa
N ⊢ sched.(ec.i) ⇒ sched.(ea.i)
(53)
The following corollaries are direct consequences of The-
orem 3, hence concerning events ea and ec as in (46) and
(47). They illustrate differentways of refining event schedul-
ing information: weakening the coarse schedule, replacing
the coarse schedule, strengthening the fine schedule, and re-
moving the fine schedule.
Corollary 1 (Coarse schedule weakening) Given fc = fa, we
have
sched.(ec.t)⇒ sched.(e.t)
if
G • (ca⇒ cc) . (54)
Proof (Sketch)Given fc= fa, conditions (F FLW) and (F STR)
of Theorem 3 are trivial. Conditions (C FLW) and (C STB)
are direct consequences of (54).
Corollary 2 (Coarse schedule replacement) Given fc = fa,
we have
sched.(ec.t)⇒ sched.(e.t)
if
ca∧ fa  cc (C FLW)
cc un ∼ca . (C STB)
Proof (Sketch)Given fc= fa, conditions (F FLW) and (F STR)
of Theorem 3 are trivial.
Corollary 3 (Fine schedule strengthening) Given cc = ca,
we have
sched.(ec.i)⇒ sched.(ea.i)
if
ca∧ fa  fc , and (F FLW)
G • (fc⇒ fa) . (F STR)
Proof (Sketch)Given cc= ca, conditions (C FLW) and (C STB)
of Theorem 3 are trivial.
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Corollary 4 (Fine schedule removal) Given cc= ca and fc=
1, we have
sched.(ec.i)⇒ sched.(ea.i)
if
G • (ca⇒ fa) . (55)
Proof (Sketch)Given cc= ca, conditions (C FLW) and (C STB)
of Theorem 3 are trivial. Given fc = 1, condition (F FLW) is
trivial and condition (F STR) is a direct consequent of (55).
A special case of event refinement allows to remove event
indices as illustrated by the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Events’ indices removal) Consider ea as fol-
lows
ea [i, j] =̂ during i= E.j.v∧ c.(i, j).v upon f .(i, j).v
when g.(i, j).v then s.(i, j).v.v′ end
(56)
The following event ec is a refinement of ea, i.e., satisfying
(EVT SAFE) and (EVT LIVE).
ec [j] =̂ during c.(E.j.v, j).v upon f .(E.j.v, j).v
when g.(E.j.v, j).v then s.(E.j.v, j).v.v′ end
(57)
Proof For (EVT SAFE), we use E.j.v as the witness for the
removing indices i, which leads to the proof obligation:
act(ec. j) ⇒ act(ea.(E.j.v, j)) .
For (EVT LIVE), we note that in the case where i 6= E.j.v,
the coarse schedule of ea is false, hence ea.i is unscheduled,
hence (EVT LIVE) is satisfied. Therefore, sched.(ec.j) =
sched(ea.(E.j.v, j)) holds.
4 Example: A Signal Control System
We illustrate our method by applying it to design a system
controlling trains at a station [12]. We first present some in-
formal requirements of the system.
4.1 Requirements
The network at the station contains an entry block, several
platform blocks and an exiting block, as seen in Figure 4.
Trains arrive on the network at the entry block, then can
move into one of the platform blocks before moving to the
exiting block and leaving the network. In order to control
the trains at the station, signals are positioned at the end of
the entry block and each platform block. The train drivers
are assumed to obey the signals. The signals are supposed to
change from green to red automatically when a train passes
by.
The most important properties of the system are that (1)
there should be no collision between trains (SAF 1), and (2)
each train in the network eventually leaves (FUN 2).
SAF 1 There is at most one train on each block
FUN 2 Each train in the network eventually leaves
ENV 3 The tracks are arranged according to Figure 4
FUN 4 Every train enters only through the entry block, then
proceed to a platform block andmove on to the exit block
from where they leave the station.
EQP 5 A light signal is positioned after the entrance block
and after each of the platforms.
ENV 6 Train drivers obey the light signals, i.e. when the
signal is green, they advance and they stop when the sig-
nal is red.
Refinement strategy Our development consists of an initial
model and five refinement steps. We summarize our refine-
ment strategy for developing the signal control system as
follows.
Init. model We abstractly model the trains in the network,
focusing on FUN 2.
1st Ref. We introduce the topology of the network ENV 3
and FUN 4.
2nd Ref. We strengthen the model of the system, focusing
on SAF 1.
3rd Ref. We introduce the signals and derive a specification
for the controller that manages these signals EQP 5 and
ENV 6.
4th Ref. We refine the controller’s specification, in particu-
lar, scheduling the trains passing the station in a first-in-
first-out manner.
5th Ref. We refine further the controller’s specification so
that it can be implemented in some programming lan-
guage.
Notation Well-definedness [19] is an important issue when
dealingwith partial functions. However, when trying to make
formulas well-defined, some overhead often has to be intro-
duced which can make said formulas bulky. For example, if
we need to express
f .x≤ g.y ,
with f ,g two partial functions, the formula is only meaning-
ful in the case where x ∈ dom . f ∧ y ∈ dom .g and the for-
mula above is therefore not necessarily well defined. This
new formula
x ∈ dom . f ∧ y ∈ dom .g ∧ f .x≤ g.y
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entry block
platform blocks
exit block
entry signal
platform signals
=⇒
Fig. 4 A signal control system
is well-defined and is often a suitable substitute for f .x≤ g.y
but it is much longer and the subject matter, the ordering of
f and g, constitute only a small fraction of the formula: the
attention of the reader is mostly drawn to the technicality of
well-definedness.
As a shorthand, we will use a new notation defined as
〈P〉 , D(P)∧P. In the previous example, we can express
the property as
〈 f .x≤ g.y〉
which is false if f .x or g.y is ill-defined and has the expected
truth value otherwise. It might be also handy to have a short-
hand for x ∈ dom . f ∧ y ∈ dom .g ⇒ f .x ≤ g.y — which is
true if f .x or g.y is ill-defined and has the normal truth value
otherwise— but we won’t need it in this paper and therefore
refrain from defining a shorthand for it.
Logic In Sect. 3, we conducted the proofs of soundness of
the refinement rules and the inference rules of temporal prop-
erties using computation calculus. In the example, we will
conduct our reasoning using these inference rules and predi-
cate calculus without reference to computation calculus. The
purpose is to use the rules as a clear interface between the
semantics of Unit-B and the reasoning about Unit-Bmodels.
Proof Format The equational proof format has been used
to advantage already in Section 2 and Section 3. There we
use this format in rewriting an expression with value pre-
serving rules or various order preserving rules (e.g.⇒, ≤),
from an initial expression to a final expression. The style of
manipulations has an algebraic flavour. In this section, we
use equational proof format to manipulate sequents instead
of normal expressions. While an expression has a value, a
sequent is provable or not. The usual way of relating two
sequents is the inference rule:
Γ ,α ⊢ φ
Γ ⊢ ψ
When building a formal proof with them, the format be-
comes quickly unwieldy and unreadable. Instead, we use ⊑
to relate two sequents in equational proofs with the under-
standing that Γ ⊢ ψ ⊑ Γ ,α ⊢ φ stands for the inference
above, i.e. Γ ⊢ ψ has a proof if Γ ,α ⊢ φ has a proof.
Sometimes, inferences rules havemore than one premise.
In such cases, in our calculations, either we keep the most
important one as the main thread of reasoning and refer to
the other ones in the hint of the step, or we list the ones we
kept one above the other. The subsequent steps can apply to
any one of them.
Naming Convention We adopt the following convention in
naming the properties appearing in the subsequent develop-
ment to indicate the type of the property (e.g., invariance,
unless, or progress), the level of refinement, and the sequent
number of the property. For example, inv0 1 is the 1st in-
variant of the initial model, while un2 1 and prg2 1 are the
1st unless property and the 1st progress property of the 2nd
refinement, respectively.
Refinement Strategy The refinement strategy for our devel-
opment is as follows.
Initial Model focuses on specifying and reasoning about the
main progress requirement FUN 2.
First refinement introduces the topology of the train sta-
tion ENV 3 and the movement of the trains through the
station FUN 4.
Second Refinement incorporates the safety requirements
of the system to prevent train collisions SAF 1.
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Third Refinement adds the light signals to the model EQP 5
and the assumption that the train drivers always obey
these light signals ENV 6.
Fourth Refinement realises a software controller for the
signals in the station. In particular, the scheduling of the
train passing through the station is performed using a
queue.
Fifth Refinement simplifies the software controller by re-
moving the index of the corresponding event.
4.2 Initial ModelM0—Arriving and Departing
In this initial modelM0, we use a carrier set TRN to denote
the set of trains and a variable st (short for station) to denote
the set of trains currently inside the station.
variables : st
invariants :
inv0 1 : st ⊆ TRN
Initially st is assigned the empty set∅. At this abstract level,
we have two events to model a train arriving at the station
and a train leaving the station as follows:
arrive [t] =̂ when t ∈ TRN then st := st ∪ {t} end
depart [t] =̂ when t ∈ TRN then st := st \ {t} end
Requirement FUN 2 can be specified as a progress prop-
erty (with t implicitly quantified universally over the whole
property):
t ∈ st  ¬t ∈ st . (prg0 1)
We attempt to use event depart to implement prg0 1 as
follows.
M0 ⊢ t ∈ st ¬t ∈ st
⊑ { Transient definition (42)}
M0 ⊢ tr t ∈ st
⊑ { Transient rule (TRS) with depart.t }
M0 ⊢ depart.t falsifies t ∈ st
⊑ { Falsifies rule (FLS) with: (C EN 1) and (NEG 1) }
true
with:
t ∈ st ⇒ false (C EN 1)
t ∈ st∧ false∧ st′=st \ {t} ⇒ ¬t ∈ st′ (NEG 1)
The proof obligation (NEG 1) is trivial. However,
(C EN 1) cannot be proved because the coarse schedule of
depart is false (since depart is current unscheduled).We can
remedy this situation by adding a coarse schedule to depart,
which becomes as follows:
depart [t] =̂ during t ∈ st
when t ∈ TRN then st := st \ {t} end
The updated proof obligations are:
t ∈ st ⇒ t ∈ st (C EN 1’)
t ∈ st ∧ t ∈ TRN ∧ st′=st \ {t} ⇒ ¬t ∈ st′ . (NEG 1’)
The proof obligations (C EN 1’) and (NEG 1’) can be eas-
ily discharged.
Note that event depart has different guard and coarse
schedule. It is our intention to design depart with a weak
guard and a strong coarse schedule that allow us to prove
system properties (e.g., invariance and progress properties).
This gives more flexibility in strengthening events’ guards
and weakening schedules as needed during the course of re-
finement.
Since event arrive will not affect the reasoning about
progress properties (it is always unscheduled), we are going
to omit its refinement in the subsequent presentation.
4.3 First RefinementM1— The Topology
In this refinementM1, we first introduce the topology of the
network in terms of blocks (ENV 3). We introduce a carrier
set BLK= {Entry}∪PLF∪{Exit} denoting the entry block,
the platform blocks and the exit block, respectively. A new
variable loc is added to denote the location of trains in the
network, constrained by this invariant:
loc ∈ st→BLK. (inv1 1)
To capture FUN 4, we formulate the following safety
properties:
¬t ∈ st un 〈loc.t = Entry〉 (un1 1)
〈loc.t = Entry〉 un 〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉 (un1 2)
〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉 un 〈loc.t = Exit〉 (un1 3)
〈loc.t = Exit〉 un ¬t ∈ st (un1 4)
They can be summarized in Figure 5.
loc.z= Entry loc.z ∈ PLF loc.z= Exit
z ∈ st z ∈ st
z /∈ st
Fig. 5 State transitions for trains
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We use (UN) to prove that they hold. In particular, for
un1 2 and un1 3, we need to strengthen the guard of depart.
Subsequently, in order to make sure that the schedule is
stronger than the guard (condition (SCH FIS)), we need to
strengthen the coarse schedule accordingly. An assignment
for loc is added for the maintenance of inv1 1.
depart [t]
during
t ∈ st ∧ loc.t = Exit
when
t ∈ st ∧ loc.t = Exit
then
st := st \ {t}
loc := {t}⊳− loc
end
In order to prove the refinement of depart, we apply
Corollary 2 (coarse schedule replacing). In particular, con-
ditions (C FLW) and (C STB) require us to prove the fol-
lowing properties:
t ∈ st  〈loc.t = Exit〉 (prg1 1)
〈loc.t = Exit〉 un ¬t ∈ st (un1 4)
From now on, we focus on reasoning about progress
properties, e.g., prg1 1, omitting the reasoning about unless
properties, e.g., un1 4. The proofs of these unless properties
can be done using (UN) and will be omitted here.
In order to satisfy prg1 1, we first transform it into a
transient property.
t ∈ st  〈loc.t = Exit〉
= { (Split-Off-Skip) }
〈¬ loc.t = Exit〉  〈loc.t = Exit〉
⊑ { (Transitivity) }
〈¬ loc.t = Exit〉  〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉
〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉  〈loc.t = Exit〉
⊑

 (Split-Off-Skip) and with (prg1 2)(see below) on first leads-to property


〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉  〈loc.t = Exit〉
⊑ { (Ensure) with (un1 3) }
tr 〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉
with the new property:
〈loc.t = Entry〉  〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉 (prg1 2)
We implement the resulting transient property, i.e.,
tr 〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉 using a new event moveout. We leave the
coarse and the fine schedule as some unknown c? and f ?, and
see how to derive them from resulting proof obligations.
moveout [t] =̂ during c? upon f ?
when t ∈ st ∧
loc.t ∈ PLF
then loc.t := Exit end
The proof that moveout implements the transient property
is as follows.
M1 ⊢ tr 〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉
⊑ { Transient rule (TRS) with moveout.t }
M1 ⊢ moveout.t falsifies 〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉
= { Falsifies rule (FLS) with (C EN 2) and (NEG 2) }
M1 ⊢ 〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉∧ c?  f ?
where:
〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉 ⇒ c? (C EN 2)
〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉 ∧ c? ∧ f ? ∧
loc′ = loc⊳−{t 7→ Exit}2 ∧ st′ = st
⇒ ¬〈loc′.t ∈ PLF〉
(NEG 2)
We design the coarse schedule c? and the fine schedule
f ? such that the goal, i.e., 〈loc.t ∈PLF〉∧c?  f ?, and con-
ditions (C EN 2) and (NEG 2) can be discharged trivially.
One such design is to have c? being t ∈ st ∧ loc.t ∈ PLF
and f ? being true. This gives us the following design for
moveout:
moveout [t]
during
t ∈ st∧ loc.t ∈ PLF
when
t ∈ st∧ loc.t ∈ PLF
then
loc.t := Exit
end
The updated conditions (C EN 2) and (NEG 2) is as fol-
lows and can be discharged easily.
〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉 ⇒ t ∈ st ∧ loc.t ∈ PLF (C EN 2)
〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉 ∧
t ∈ st ∧ loc.t ∈ PLF ∧ true ∧
loc′ = loc⊳−{t 7→ Exit} ∧ st′ = st
⇒ ¬〈loc′.t ∈ PLF〉
(NEG 2)
The remaining progress property, i.e., prg1 2, can be im-
plemented in a similar fashion. We first transform prg1 2
into a transient property and implement it by the following
new eventmovein.
2 loc⊳−{t 7→ Exit} denotes a relation equal to loc excepts for the
entry for t which is mapped to Exit.
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movein [t]
during
t ∈ st∧ loc.t = Entry
when
t ∈ st∧ loc.t = Entry
then
loc.t :∈ PLF
end
Applying the unless rule (UN), we can verify that the
new events, i.e., movein and moveout, satisfy safety con-
straints, such as un1 1, un1 2, un1 3, and un1 4. It should
be noted that those safety requirements guided our design of
the new events along side the progress properties that they
are meant to satisfy.
4.4 Second RefinementM2— Preventing Collisions
In this refinement, M2, we incorporate the safety require-
ment stating that there are no collisions between trains within
the network, i.e., SAF 1. This is captured by a new invariant
about loc:
(∀ t1, t2 : t1, t2 ∈ st∧ loc.t1 = loc.t2 : t1 = t2). (inv2 1)
The guard of event moveout needs to be strengthened
with the fact that the exit block is free (i.e., ¬Exit ∈
ran .loc), to maintain inv2 1. Due to the feasibility condi-
tion (SCH FIS) for Unit-B events (requiring the schedules
to be stronger than the guard), we need to strengthen the
schedules accordingly. In particular, we add a fine schedule
to moveout:
moveout [t]
during
t ∈ st∧ loc.t ∈ PLF
upon
¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
when
t ∈ st ∧ loc.t ∈ PLF ∧ ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
then
loc.t := Exit
end
The scheduling information for moveout states that for any
train t, if t stays in a platform for infinitely long and the exit
block becomes free infinitely often, then t will eventually
move out of the platform.
Heuristics. So far, all the scheduling information was en-
coded in coarse schedules. It is a general principle that coarse
schedules should be used over fine schedules whenever pos-
sible. This is because, contrary to fine schedules, each coarse
schedule can be manipulated in separation from each other.
For example, if during refinement we want to replace the
coarse schedule a0∧a1∧ p with c0∧c1∧ p, we can meet the
proof obligation by proving
a0∧a1∧ p c0∧ c1∧ p ,
c0∧ c1∧ p un a0∧a1∧ p .
Since the two schedules involved can be arbitrarily complex,
it is often more convenient to break down the proof obliga-
tion into the following smaller ones:
a0 c0
a1 c1
c0 un ¬a0
c1 un ¬a1
Instead of seeing the replacement of the coarse schedule as
one operation, we can see it as the replacement of a0 with c0
and a1 with c1. This is especially convenient because the set
of concrete schedules is rarely manipulated all at once.
In comparison, when refining fine schedules, the proof
obligation (a0∧a1∧ p c0∧c1∧ p) has to be dealt with as
a whole. The comparison between coarse and fine schedule
is similar when proving liveness properties. This is why we
should keep the fine schedules as small as possible.
One situation favors fine schedules. Contentions happen
when many events have to occur and the occurrence of one
falsifies the schedules of the others. A mutual exclusion pro-
tocol is a good example of contention. The enter critical section
event of each process has to occur when the process is wait-
ing but no other process is in its critical section. When two
processes, say p0 and p1 are waiting, if p0 first enters its
critical section, it falsifies p1’s schedule. If it were a coarse
schedule, this means that there is no guarantee that the other
process will ever be granted access to its critical section. The
situation can be fixed by making part of the events’ sched-
ule coarse and the other part fine. The fact that p1 is waiting
is stable and no other process will falsify this. It can there-
fore safely be made into the coarse schedule. The other part,
the condition that no other process be in their critical region,
should be made into the fine schedule. It is not stable but as
long as it becomes true infinitely often, p1 will be granted
access to its critical section.
As a rule of thumb, most schedules should be made into
coarse schedules.When liveness properties cannot be proved,
coarse schedules should be selectively made into fine sched-
ules.
(end of heuristics)
In order to prove the refinement of moveout, we apply
Corollary 3 (fine schedule strengthening), which requires to
prove the following progress property. The abstract event
moveout has no fine schedules, it is assumed to be true. Con-
dition (F STR) is trivial since the abstract fine schedule is
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true. Condition (F FLW) leads to the following property:
〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉  ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc , (prg2 1)
which can be strengthened to
true  ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc (prg2 2)
We satisfy prg2 2 (which is a transient property) by apply-
ing the transient rule (TRS) using event depart with the in-
dex denoting the train at the Exit location, i.e., loc−1.Exit.
Intuitively, the train at the exit block will eventually depart,
hence the exit block becomes free.
M2 ⊢ tr Exit ∈ ran .loc
⊑ { Transient rule (TRS) with depart.((loc−1).Exit)}
M2 ⊢ depart.((loc
−1).Exit) falsifies Exit ∈ ran .loc
= { Falsifies rule (FLS) with (C EN 3) and (NEG 3) }
true
where:
Exit ∈ ran .loc
⇒
(loc−1).Exit ∈ st
∧ loc.( (loc−1).Exit ) = Exit
(C EN 3)
Exit ∈ ran .loc
∧ (loc−1).Exit ∈ st
∧ loc.( (loc−1).Exit ) = Exit
∧ true
∧ loc′ = { (loc−1).Exit } ⊳− loc
∧ st′ = st \ { (loc−1).Exit }
⇒ ¬ Exit ∈ ran .loc′
(NEG 3)
The proofs of conditions (C EN 3) and (NEG 3) are straight-
forward and will be left out.
Finally we strengthen the guard of movein and subse-
quently strengthen its coarse schedule.We apply Corollary 2
(coarse schedule replacing) movein. The detailed proof is
omitted here.
movein [t]
during
t ∈ st∧ loc.t = Entry∧ ¬PLF ⊆ ran .loc
when
t ∈ st∧ loc.t = Entry∧ ¬PLF ⊆ ran .loc
then
loc.t :∈ PLF \ ran .loc
end
4.4.1 Comparison between Coarse/Fine Schedules and
Weak/Strong Fairness
Event moveout has both a coarse and a fine schedule. The
alternative, using only weak or strong fairness, would com-
plicate the proofs and make refinement of the system more
difficult.
On the one hand, weak-fairness requires for the exit block
to remain free continuously in order for trains to move out.
This assumption is not met by the current system: if, in-
finitely often, another train than t located at a different plat-
form moves on to the exit block before t does, t’s weak-
fairness allows for t to stay where it is forever. In other
words, the weak- fairness assumption for moveout will be
too weak; it does not guarantee that a train inside the station
will eventually exit. An attempt to prove the refinement with
the weakly-fairmoveout event using Corollary 2 will lead to
the following unprovable (C STB) condition.
〈loc.t ∈ PLF ∧ ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc〉
un ¬(t ∈ st ∧ loc.t ∈ PLF)
(58)
The event that fails to satisfy (58) ismoveout for train other
than the current t.
On the other hand, strong-fairness would allow a train to
access the exit block if it is present on the platform intermit-
tently. This assumption is more flexible than we need since it
allows behaviours where a train hops on and off the platform
infinitely often while waiting for its turn at the exit block.
The price of that flexibility is to entangle properties of the
exit block with properties of trains: indeed, we would need
not only to prove that the train will be on its platform and
that the exit block will become free but that both happen si-
multaneously infinitely often. More formally, while we can
prove that the strongly-fair moveout event refines the ab-
stract moveout event, future refinement of moveout will be
more difficult due to the stronger scheduling assumption.We
choose to relinquish this flexibility and are therefore capable
of structuring our proof better: on one hand, the train stays
on its platform as long as necessary; independently, the exit
block becomes free infinitely many times. This (choosing
a weaker scheduling assumption) is similar to choosing a
weaker guard such that safety properties are satisfied: it is
minimalistic and gives more flexibility for later refinements.
The relationship between our schedules (coarse/fine) and
fairness assumptions (weak/strong) can be illustrated as fol-
lows. Consider the following events with identical actions.
The guard of these events are also the same as c∧ f for some
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predicates c, f .
ewf =̂ during c∧ f
when c∧ f then . . . end
esch =̂ during c upon f
when c∧ f then . . . end
esf =̂ upon c∧ f
when c∧ f then . . . end
Event ewf is scheduled with weakly fairness, event esf is
scheduled with strongly fairness. Event esch’s scheduling is
split between a coarse schedule c and a fine schedule f . Con-
sider the strength of their scheduling assumption, we have
the following relationship:
sched.ewf ⇐ sched.esch ⇐ sched.esf .
In fact, using coarse and fine schedules, we can specify a
finer-grained spectrum of scheduling assumptions (compared
to fairness assumptions) with the minimum being the weak-
fairness assumption and themaximumbeing the strong-fairness
assumption, as can be seen in Figure 6.
Weak
Fairness
Strong
Fairness
Coarse/Fine
Schedules
Fig. 6 The spectrum of scheduling assumptions
4.5 Third Refinement — The Actuators
In this refinementM3, we focus on requirements EQP 5 and
ENV 6 which describe the light signals in the station and
state the assumption that the train drivers always obey these
light signals. So far, moveout and movein which model the
behaviour of individual trains and their driver, state that the
trains move when it is safe to. However, the drivers often
cannot judge for themselves whether it is safe to proceed
because they cannot see all the dangers. This is why we
adopt the convention of the light signals: wherever it may
be dangerous to proceed, a light signal is located and can
only be green if it is safe for the train it is addressed to ad-
vance. This allows us to change the guard and schedules of
the train events to only refer to information that the drivers
have access to.
We continue our development by modelling the signals
associated with different blockswithin the network. Variable
g sgn is introduced to denote the set of platform for which
the light signal is green. We focus the rest of this section on
the control of the signals regulating the departure from the
platforms. In particular, invariants inv3 2 and inv3 3 state
that if a platform signal is green then the exit block is free
and the other platform signals are red. Invariant inv3 4 states
that the signal is green only for occupied platforms.
invariants :
inv3 1 : g sgn⊆ PLF
inv3 2 : Exit ∈ ran .loc ⇒ g sgn=∅
inv3 3 : (∀ p,q : p,q ∈ g sgn : p= q)
inv3 4 : g sgn ⊆ ran .loc
We refine the moveout event to use the platform signal
as follows.
moveout [t]
during
t ∈ st∧ loc.t ∈ PLF
∧ loc.t ∈ g sgn
upon
¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
when
t ∈ st∧ loc.t ∈ PLF
∧ loc.t ∈ g sgn
then
loc.t := Exit
g sgn := g sgn\ {loc.t}
end
The refinement of moveout is justified by applying Theo-
rem 3 which requires us to prove the following:
〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉  〈loc.t ∈ PLF∩g sgn〉 (C FLW 3)
〈loc.t ∈ PLF∩g sgn〉 un ¬〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉 (C STB 3)
〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉∧¬Exit ∈ ran .loc  true (F FLW 3)
〈loc.t ∈ PLF∩g sgn〉∧ true
⇒ ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
(F STR 3)
(F FLW 3) follows directly from the implication rule
(Implication); (F STR 3) follows from inv3 2; (C STB 3)
requires a number of simple proofs which will be left out. To
discharge (C FLW 3), we apply the ensure-rule (Ensure).
〈loc.t ∈ PLF〉 un 〈loc.t ∈ PLF∩g sgn〉 (un3 1)
tr 〈loc.t ∈ PLF \ g sgn〉 (prg3 1)
Ignoring safety property un3 1, we focus on prg3 1. In
order to have an event to falsify 〈loc.t ∈ PLF \ g sgn〉, we
need the event to add loc.t to g sgn, i.e., to turn to green the
signal of the platform where t is. This is clearly a task of the
controller rather than a model of the trains. Therefore, we
introduce a controller event, ctrl platform, indexed with the
platforms. Our first design for ctrl platform is as follows.
ctrl platform [p]
during
p ∈ ran .loc∧p ∈ PLF \ g sgn
begin
g sgn := g sgn∪ {p}
end
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The proof that ctrl platform implements prg3 1 is as fol-
lows.
M3 ⊢ tr 〈loc.t ∈ PLF \ g sgn〉
⊑ { Transient rule (TRS) with ctrl platform.(loc.t)}
M3 ⊢ ctrl platform.(loc.t) falsifies
〈loc.t ∈ PLF \ g sgn〉
= { Falsifies rule (FLS) with (C EN 4) and (NEG 4)}
true
where:
〈loc.t ∈ PLF \ g sgn〉
⇒
loc.t ∈ ran .loc // coarse schedule
∧ loc.t ∈ PLF \ g sgn
(C EN 4)
〈loc.t ∈ PLF \ g sgn〉
∧ loc.t ∈ ran .loc
∧ loc.t ∈ PLF \ g sgn
∧ g sgn′ = g sgn∪ {loc.t} // action
∧ loc′ = loc
⇒
¬〈loc′.t ∈ PLF \ g sgn′〉
(NEG 4)
Notice that we choose the coarse schedule of ctrl platform
so as to simplify the proof of (C EN 4). Furthermore, we
choose the assignment to g sgn in such a way as to satisfy
(NEG 4).
The next step is to prove that ctrl platform satisfies the
safety properties (i.e. unless properties and invariants) of the
current refinement. In order to prove inv3 2 and inv3 3, we
need to strengthen the guard to:
p ∈ PLF ∧ p ∈ ran .loc ∧ ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc ∧ g sgn=∅ .
Due to feasibility condition (SCH FIS), we need to strengthen
the schedules of ctrl platform accordingly. Since strength-
ening the current coarse schedule will invalidate the cur-
rent proof of (C EN 4), we introduce the following new fine
schedule for ctrl platform:
¬Exit ∈ ran .loc ∧ g sgn=∅ .
Event ctrl platform is finalized as:
ctrl platform [p]
during
p ∈ ran .loc∧p ∈ PLF \ g sgn
upon
¬Exit ∈ ran .loc∧g sgn=∅
when
p ∈ PLF ∧ p ∈ ran .loc
∧ ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc ∧ g sgn=∅
then
g sgn := g sgn∪ {p}
end
Event part Formula PO
coarse schedule prg3 1 (C EN 4)
action prg3 1 (NEG 4)
guard inv3 2 and inv3 3 invariance
fine schedule guard (SCH FIS)
Table 1 Proof obligations and formulas justifying the design of
ctrl platform
Table 1 summarizes the design choices behind event ctrl platform.
It is interesting to see that, in this refinement, we effec-
tively shift the fine schedule frommoveout (an environment
event) to ctrl platform (a controller event). The model re-
mains abstract when it comes to specify the order in which
the trains gain access to the exit block but specific enough to
maintain liveness.
Event ctrl platform is a specification for the computer
to control the platform signals satisfying both safety and
liveness properties of the overall system. In particular, the
scheduling information states that if (1) a platform is occu-
pied and the platform signal is red infinitely long and (2) the
exit block is unoccupied and the other platform signals are
all red infinitely often, then the system should eventually
turn this platform signal to green. The refinement of event
movein and how the entry signal is controlled is similar and
omitted for the rest of the paper.
The new fine schedule changes the earlier proof of prg3 1
in two ways. First, the fine schedule gets in the antecedent of
(NEG 4), which does not invalidate the proof of (NEG 4).
Second, we get an additional leads-to property to prove cor-
responding to (F EN).
〈loc.t ∈ PLF \ g sgn〉  ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
∧ g sgn=∅
(F EN 4)
We start the proof of (F EN 4) by weakening its right-
hand side to true (consequence of transitivity (Transitivity)
and implication (Implication) rules) and we keep refining it
until we can implement it simply.
true  ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc ∧ g sgn=∅
⊑ { (Transitivity) }
true  g sgn=∅
g sgn=∅  ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc ∧ g sgn=∅
⊑


(PSP) on second with p := true ,
q := ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc , r := g sgn=∅ ,
b := ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc ∧ g sgn=∅


true  g sgn=∅ (prg3 2)
true  ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc (prg3 3)
g sgn=∅ un ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc ∧ g sgn=∅ (un3 2)
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We leave out the detailed proof for prg3 2 and un3 2:
prg3 2 is a transient property which can be implemented by
moveout event, un3 2 is a trivial safety property.
Property prg3 3 is identical to prg2 2 in the second re-
finementM2. However, we cannot directly reuse prg2 2 since
this could lead to circular reasoning. As explained below,
additional precautions are required to avoid the problem.
4.5.1 Reusing Progress Properties
Property prg2 2, which states that the exit block becomes
free infinitely often, turns out to be a key abstraction in M2.
InM3 and later refinements, it will be very important that the
exit block be available infinitely many times so that, even if
a given train misses the first opportunity to move away from
its platform, it still is certain to get a turn eventually. As a
result, we would like to reuse prg2 2 in the reasoning about
M3 and subsequent refinements.
Earlier, we have proved thatM2 satisfies prg2 2, i.e.,
[ ex.M2 ⇒ prg2 2 ] . (59)
To ensure thatM3 refinesM2, we prove
[ ex.M3 ⇒ ex.M2 ] (60)
Succeed in proving (60), together with (59), will ensure that
M3 also satisfies prg2 2. However, we cannot directly reuse
prg2 2 during the proof of (60): our reasoning would be cir-
cular.
In order to avoid circular reasoning, for each model, we
keep a binary relation representing the dependency between
progress properties of interest and the events that contribute
to their implementation. Consider the initial modelM0, since
the property prg0 1 is eventually implemented by depart,
the dependency relation can be
{prg0 1 7→ (M0.)depart}.
In the first refinement, consider the dependency for
prg0 1, it is dependent on event (M1.)depart (which is the
refinement of the abstract event (M0.)depart) and events
moveout, movein (which are used for proving the refine-
ment of (M0.)depart by (M1.)depart).
{prg0 1 7→ (M1.)depart,
prg0 1 7→ (M1.)moveout,
prg0 1 7→ (M1.)movein} .
More formally, the dependency relation denotes the re-
lationship between the scheduling assumptions of the events
and the property these events implement. Consider a model
M and its dependency relation:
{P1 7→ (M.)e1,P1 7→ (M.)e2,P2 7→ (M.)e3} .
The above relation encodes the following conditions:
[ saf .M∧ sched.e1∧ sched.e2 ⇒ P1 ] (61)
[ saf .M∧ sched.e3 ⇒ P2 ] (62)
For a given model, we only need to consider the dependency
relation for the progress properties that we want subsequent
refinements to reuse. By default, progress properties are not
reused.
In summary, the dependency relation summarizes the
proofs (accumulated through refinement) of progress prop-
erties. We use it in order to avoid any circular reasoning
linked to the reuse of progress properties. A progress prop-
erty can be reused only after its effecting events have been
refined. Naturally, during the proof of refinements of these
dependent events, the progress property cannot be used. This
means that if, in a refinement ofM in the previous example,
we replace the coarse schedule of e1, we cannot use P1 in
the proof of (C FLW).
Coming back to the train station example, we are inter-
ested in reusing prg2 2 which is introduced in M2. Since
prg2 2 is implemented by depart, the dependency relation
forM2 is as follows:
{prg2 2 7→ (M2.)depart} .
Since depart is unchanged in M3, its refinement is trivial.
Therefore, we are free to make use of prg2 2 in all the proofs
of liveness inM3. It also follows that, the dependency forM3
is the same as that ofM2, i.e.,
{prg2 2 7→ (M3.)depart} .
In fact, property prg2 2 is also reused in future refinements.
4.6 Fourth Refinement — The Controller
In this refinement M4, we focus on realising the software
controller. At the end of the previous refinement, the con-
troller is entirely specified by ctrl platform which has a fine
schedule. Although the fine schedule is a useful specification
mechanism, we argue that it is not readily implementable.
While it is easy to produce a correct (if not efficient) imple-
mentation for an event that has only a coarse schedule — a
program that tests infinitely often (every second, every min-
utes or every year) the schedule and execute the event when
its guard is true would be a correct implementation — it is
not so straightforward for a fine schedule. Repeatedly testing
a fine schedule will be incorrect in a situation where the fine
schedule becomes true and false infinitely many times and
that the program just happens to test infinitely many times
only when it is false. This naive scheduler will fail to detect
that the event has to be executed.
To make our controller more deterministic, we now pro-
ceed to refining ctrl platform’s fine schedule away. For that
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purpose, we introduce three new variables (qe, hd, tl) to
model a queue. Variable qe is an injective function from
platform to an interval of integers where hd is the index of
the first element of the queue and tl is the index just after
the last element of the queue. This entails that the queue is
empty when hd = tl.
As a convention, platforms are pulled at hd and inserted
at tl. Below, [hd, tl) is an integer interval that includes hd
but excludes tl and (qe−1)[ {hd} ] is the application of the
inverse of qe to the set {hd}. The latter has the particular-
ity that, when hd is not in the range of qe, the expression
evaluates to the empty set rather than being undefined.
invariants :
inv4 1 : qe ∈ PLF 7֌ [hd, tl)
inv4 2 : g sgn⊆ (qe−1)[ {hd} ]
inv4 3 : dom .qe = PLF∩ ran .loc
In order to maintain inv4 3, we let movein increase tl and
insert the platforms in the queue as they become occupied
and moveout increase hd and remove the platforms as they
become free.
movein [t]
during
...
when
...
then
...
tl := tl+1
qe.(loc′.t) := tl
loc.t :∈ PLF
\ ran .loc
end
moveout [t]
during
...
when
loc.t ∈ g sgn
then
...
hd := hd+1
qe :=qe⊲−{hd}
loc.t := Exit
g sgn := g sgn
\{loc.t}
end
With the queue, we can schedule the controller deter-
ministically: to turn green the light signal of a platform, that
platform has to be the head of the queue. Event ctrl platform
is refined as follows.
ctrl platform [p]
during
p ∈ PLF∩ ran .loc
p ∈ dom .qe
∧ qe.p= hd
∧ ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
∧ ¬p ∈ g sgn
upon
¬Exit ∈ ran .loc∧g sgn=∅
when
p ∈ PLF∧p ∈ ran .loc
∧ ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc∧g sgn=∅
then
g sgn := g sgn∪ {p}
end
We apply Theorem 3 to prove the refinement of
ctrl platform. Omitting the trivial obligations related to
(F FLW) and (F STR), we focus on the obligations for
replacing p ∈ PLF ∩ ran .loc (which is equivalent to p ∈
dom .qe) with 〈qe.p = hd〉∧¬Exit ∈ ran .loc for the coarse
schedule of ctrl platform (i.e., conditions (C FLW) and
(C STB)).
p ∈ dom .qe  〈qe.p= hd〉 ∧
¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
(C FLW 5)
〈qe.p= hd〉
∧ ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc un ¬p ∈ dom .qe
(C STB 5)
So far in our development, progress properties can be
separated in two different groups:
1. Those that are satisfied in a single step. These properties
are proved by transforming them into transient proper-
ties (for example, making use of rules such as ensure-
rule (Ensure)). Each transient property is implement by
an individual event using a combination of transient rule
(TRS) and falsifies rule (FLS).
2. Those that are satisfied in some pre-determined number
of steps. These properties are proved by breaking them
down into several properties that can be satisfied in a
single step using transitivity (Transitivity).
Property (C FLW 5) does not fit neither categories so
far. In fact, the number of steps to satisfy (C FLW 5) de-
pends on the position of the platform p within the queue qe.
As a result, in order to prove (C FLW 5) we apply the in-
duction rule (Induction).
p ∈ dom .qe  〈qe.p= hd〉 ∧
¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
⊑ { Induction rule (Induction)}
〈qe.p−hd=M〉 〈qe.p− hd <M〉 ∨
〈qe.p=hd∧¬Exit ∈ ran .loc〉
(prg4 1)
⊑


(PSP) with p := 〈qe.p− hd=M〉 ,
q := ¬〈qe.p− hd =M〉 ,
r := 〈qe.p− hd≤M〉 ,
b := 〈qe.p= hd〉∧¬Exit ∈ ran .loc


〈qe.p− hd=M〉  ¬〈qe.p− hd=M〉 (prg4 2)
〈qe.p− hd≤M〉 un 〈qe.p= hd〉 ∧
¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
(un4 1)
We focus on the development for prg4 2. It basically
says that, eventually, either the value of qe.p− hd changes
or p is no longer in the queue. While this is exactly what
moveout does, we cannot prove thatmoveout falsifies 〈qe.p−
hd = M〉. This is because it could take as many as three
steps to do that. For example, let us assume that there is
a train at the Exit block, i.e., Exit ∈ ran .loc, all the plat-
form signals are red, hence g sgn = ∅. In order to falsify
〈qe.p− hd=M〉, the following steps have to happen:
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1. Event depart frees the Exit block,
2. Event ctrl platform turns the platform signal to green for
some platform,
3. Event moveout moves to the exit block the train located
at the platform for which the signal is green.
As a result, we use (Transitivity) to split prg4 2 into
three different properties.
〈qe.p− hd =M〉  〈qe.p− hd=M〉 ∧
¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
(prg4 3)
〈qe.p− hd=M〉
∧ ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
 
〈qe.p− hd=M〉 ∧
¬g sgn⊆∅ ∧
¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
(prg4 4)
〈qe.p− hd=M〉
∧ ¬g sgn⊆∅
∧ ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc  ¬〈qe.p− hd=M〉
(prg4 5)
Subsequently, our intention is to implement prg4 3
with depart, prg4 4 with ctrl platform, and prg4 5 with
moveout, according to our informal reasoning before. The
detail proofs are left out.
4.7 Refinement 5 — Removal of the Event Indices
At the end of the fourth refinement, the controller event
ctrl platform is indexed with the platform p whose signal
is going to be turned green. However, since p is determined
as the head of the queue qe, we can remove the index of
ctrl platform. The final version of ctrl platform is as fol-
lows.
ctrl platform
during
hd < tl
∧ ¬Exit ∈ ran .loc
∧ ¬(qe−1).hd ∈ g sgn
when
¬Exit ∈ ran .loc ∧ g sgn=∅
then
g sgn := g sgn∪ {(qe−1).hd}
end
The refinement of ctrl platform can be justified trivially us-
ing Theorem 4, with (qe−1).hd as the witness for the re-
moved index p.
The first-in-first-out policy may appear too rigid because
it does not allow trains to stand still at a platform for a while
when they are ahead of schedule. We chose to adhere to it
because of its simplicity which is a correct choice since the
ability for trains to linger is not one of the stated require-
ments. It would, however, make for an interesting model,
one which is outside the scope of this paper.
4.8 Summary
Our development from M0 to M5 is driven by both safety
and progress concerns. In particular, we choose on purpose
to take into account liveness requirement FUN 2 at M0. As
a result, the need to prove and maintain progress proper-
ties justifies a number of design decisions within our devel-
opment. We summarize the key features and techniques of
Unit-B that have illustrated throughout our case study.
M0 We introduce the basis of modelling using scheduled
events and application of transient rule (TRS) to prove
simple progress properties.
M1 We illustrate how to refine scheduled events, and ap-
plications of transitivity rule (Transitivity) and ensure
rule (Ensure) to prove progress properties.
M2 We discuss the difference between coarse/fine sched-
ules and weak/strong fairness.
M3 We illustrate how progress properties that have been
proved in earlier abstract models can be reused through
refinement.
M4 We compare different strategies for implementing pro-
gress properties: single step (ensure and transient rules),
pre-determined number of steps (transitivity rule), arbi-
trary finite number of steps (induction rule).
M5 We illustrate how events can be made more concrete by
removing indices.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented Unit-B, a formal method inspired
by Event-B and UNITY. Our method allows systems to be
developed gradually via refinement and support reasoning
about both safety and liveness properties. An important fea-
ture of Unit-B is the notion of coarse and fine schedules
for events. Standard weak and strong fairness assumptions
can be expressed using these event schedules. We proposed
and prove the soundness of refinement rules to manipulate
the coarse and fine schedules so that liveness properties are
preserved automatically (i.e., without the need to reprove
them). We illustrated Unit-B by developing a signal control
system.
A key observation in Unit-B is the role of event schedul-
ing regarding liveness properties being similar to the role
of guards regarding safety properties. Guards prevent events
from occurring in unsafe states so that safety properties will
not be violated; similarly, schedules ensure the occurrence
of events in order to satisfy liveness properties.
Another key aspect of Unit-B is the role of progress
properties during refinement: the obligation to prove new
progress properties in the application of refinement rules
motivates the introduction of new events and suggests the
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refinement of old events. In short, the progress considera-
tions guide the refinement of the system.
Related work Unit-B and Event-B differ mainly in the
scheduling assumptions. In Event-B, event executions are
assumed to satisfy a minimal progress condition: as long as
there are some enabled events, one of them will be executed
non-deterministically. Given this assumption, certain live-
ness properties can be proved for Event-B models such as
progress and persistence [10]. The minimum progress as-
sumption is often too weak to prove the required set of live-
ness properties. Furthermore, the liveness properties that can
be proved using minimal progress have to be reproved in
later refinements to ascertain that they still hold.
TLA+ [17] is another well-known formal method based
on refinement supporting reasoning about liveness proper-
ties. The execution of a TLA+ model is also captured as
a formula with safety and liveness sub-formulae expressed
in the Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) [16]. Actions in
TLA+ (events in Unit-B) can be scheduled with weak or
strong fairness. Refinement in TLA+ is based on the WF2
and SF2 rules [16]. Rule WF2 allows a weakly fair event to
be refined by another weakly fair event and Rule SF2 allows
a strongly fair event to be refined by another strongly fair
event. The refinement rule for Unit-B is more general than
the combination ofWF2 and SF2: during refinement, we can
trade freely between the weakly fair component (i.e., the
coarse schedule) and the strongly fair component (i.e., the
fine schedule). Moreover, liveness properties in TLA+ are
considered to be unimportant [17, Chapter 8]. In our opin-
ion, developing systems satisfying liveness properties is as
important as ensuring that the systems satisfy safety proper-
ties. We argue that the liveness properties should be consid-
ered from the early stages of the design. Indeed, addressing
liveness properties as an after thought in the design process
will often lead to complicated proofs, since the model is not
designed with proofs of liveness properties in mind.
See [18] for a review of the temporal logic framework
developed by Manna and Pnueli. The authors use fair tran-
sition systems for the semantics of concurrent or reactive
programs and temporal logic for specifying system prop-
erties. Rules are provided for proving response properties
(called progress properties in this paper) that rely on just or
compassionate transitions (equivalent to the weak and strong
fairness scheduling policies) of the system for their validity.
Although the Manna-Pnueli framework does not have a pro-
gress preserving refinement calculus as in Unit-B, it does
have rules for data abstraction and compositional reasoning.
The idea of combining different formal methods to rea-
son about liveness properties is also explored by other re-
searchers. In [20], the authors combine Event-B and TLA+
for proving liveness properties in population protocols.While
refinement has been used in their development, liveness prop-
erties are not preserved: progress properties have to be re-
proved at each level of refinement.
Future work Currently, we only consider superposition re-
finement in Unit-B where variables are retained during re-
finement. More generally, variables can be removed and re-
placed by other variables during refinement (data refinement).
We are working on extending Unit-B to provide rules for
data refinement.
Another important technique for coping with the diffi-
culties in developing complex systems is composition / de-
composition and is already a part of methods such as Event-
B and UNITY. We intend to investigate on how this tech-
nique can be added to Unit-B, in particular, the role of event
scheduling during composition / decomposition.
Tool support is currently under construction under the
name Literate Unit-B. The goal is to integrate seamlessly the
activities of modelling, proving and documenting. We do so
by making equational proofs first class citizens in models,
by taking LATEX source files at the input of the tool and al-
lowing arbitrary interleaving of model and proof elements.
We use the Z3 SMT solver [21] to discharge the proofs obli-
gations and to validate the proof steps.
The goal is to allow the user to formulate formal proofs
in a clear manner and integrate them in the documentation
of the models, letting the tool verify that every step of rea-
soning is sound or suggest where a lemma would be needed
to justify a step. Such a tool is needed for the Unit-B method
to be practical. This tool substantially reduces the burden of
validity checking therefore allowing developers to focus on
the software design.
As is the case with Rodin [3], the tool for Event-B, a
large percentage of proof obligations can be discharged au-
tomatically, freeing the user from the need to check many
simple facts. This leaves him with the job of proving only
the hardest obligations. It is useful then to be able to design
and present the proof of these hard theorems using a for-
mat that is both readable by humans and amenable to formal
reasoning by humans. We believe the equational format [9]
exhibits these properties since it permits the user to focus on
one line of reasoning at a time.
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